State of Utah v. James and Jeanne Redd : Reply Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2000
State of Utah v. James and Jeanne Redd : Reply
Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Walter F. Bugden, Jr.; Bugden, Collins & Morton; Rod W. Snow; Dixon; Attorneys for Appellee.
Joanne C. Slotnik; Assistant Attorney General; Jan Graham; Attorney General; William L. Benge;
San Juan County Attorney, Pro Tem; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. Redd, No. 20000556.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/510
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
JAMES AND JEANNE REDD, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
Case No. 20000556-SC 
Priority No. 10 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM DISMISSAL OF AN INFORMATION 
CHARGING TWO ALTERNATIVE COUNTS OF ABUSE OR 
DESECRATION OF A DEAD HUMAN BODY, A THIRD 
DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 76-9-704(1) (1996), IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, 
THE HONORABLE MARY L. MANLEY, PRESIDING 
WALTER F. BUGDEN, JR. 
Bugden, Collins & Morton 
623 East 2100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK (4414) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
WILLIAM L. BENGE 
San Juan County Attorney, Pro Tern 
Attorneys for Appellant 
ROD W. SNOW 
Dixon Sc Snow 
425 South Cherry St., #1000 
Denver, CO 80246-1236 
Attorneys for Appellees FILED , 
UTAH S< IE COURT 
n r c *8 2000 
I IL. 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : 
v. : Case No. 20000556-
JAMES AND JEANNE REDD, : Priority No. 10 
Defendants/Appellees. : 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM DISMISSAL OF AN INFORMATION 
CHARGING TWO ALTERNATIVE COUNTS OF ABUSE OR 
DESECRATION OF A DEAD HUMAN BODY, A THIRD 
DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 76-9-704(1) (1996), IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, 
THE HONORABLE MARY L. MANLEY, PRESIDING 
WALTER F. BUGDEN, JR. 
Bugden, Collins & Morton 
623 East 2100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
ROD W. SNOW 
Dixon & Snow 
425 South Cherry St., #1000 
Denver, CO 80246-1236 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK (4414) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
WILLIAM L. BENGE 
San Juan County Attorney, Pro Tern 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Attorneys for Appellees 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
ARGUMENT 1 
BRICKEY DOES NOT RAISE A REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION OF 
HARASSMENT WHENEVER THE STATE REFILES CRIMINAL CHARGES 
THAT HAVE BEEN PREVIOUSLY DISMISSED FOR INSUFFICIENT 
EVIDENCE 1 
CONCLUSION 7 
ADDENDA - No addenda necessary 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
STATE CASES 
Gray v. State. 728 So. 2d 36 (Miss. 1998) 6 
Jones v. State. 481 P.2d 169 (Okla. App. 1971) 5 
Lustiq v. Intermountain Building & Loan Association. 
123 P.2d 707 (Utah 1942) 6 
People v. Gallegos, 54 Cal. App. 4th 252, 
62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 666 (Cal. App. 1997) 4 
People v. Sabell. 708 P.2d 463 (Colo. 1985) 4 
State v. Bacon. 791 P.2d 429 (Idaho 1990) 5 
State v. Brickev. 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986) 1, 2, 3 
State v. Pail. 424 N.W.2d 99 (Neb. 1988) 5 
State v. Eaton. 462 A.2d 502 (Me 1983) 4 
State v. Elling. 506 P.2d 1102 (Ariz. App. 1973) 4 
State v. Fisk, 966 P.2d 860 (Utah App. 1998) 4 
State v. Morgan. 2000 UT App. 48, 997 P.2d 910, 
cert, granted. 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000) 2 
State v. Redd. 954 P.2d 230 (Utah App. 1998) 3 
State v. Rubek. 371 N.W.2d 115 (Neb. 1985) 4 
State v. Stockwell. 573 P.2d 116 (Idaho 1977) 5 
Tooele Building Association v. Tooele High School. 
134 P.894 (Utah 1913) 6 
Utah Liquor Control Commission v. Seventh District Court. 
Ill P.2d 144 6 
ii 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-704 (1996) 2 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-7 2 
Utah R. Crim. P. 7 2 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
2 McCormick on Evidence §343 (5th ed.) 6 
2 Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure 
§14.3 (1984) 4 
iii 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
JAMES AND JEANNE REDD, 
Defendants/Appellees, 
Case No. 20000556-SC 
Priority No. 10 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
BRICKEY DOES NOT RAISE A REBUTTABLE 
PRESUMPTION OF HARASSMENT WHENEVER 
THE STATE REFILES CRIMINAL CHARGES 
THAT HAVE BEEN PREVIOUSLY DISMISSED 
FOR INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE 
The gist of defendants' argument is that refiling criminal 
charges that have been dismissed for lack of evidence creates a 
presumption that the State is unconstitutionally harassing 
defendants. See Br. of Apees. at 10, 14-15. Citing State v. 
Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986), defendants contend that this 
presumption of harassment can only be overcome if the State 
proves that "other good cause" justifies refiling. Br. of Apees. 
at 14. In defendants' view, where the State both failed to 
adduce evidence of interment at the first preliminary hearing and 
then failed to prove "other good cause" at the second preliminary 
hearing, Brickey's presumption that the State was harassing 
1 
defendants by refiling charges necessarily bars further action 
against them. Id. at 10-11, 12-13, 15. 
Defendants' argument fails, first, because it rests on a 
legally incorrect assumption. Brickev does not in every case 
create a rebuttable presumption of harassment.1 The general rule 
governing refiling is articulated in rule 7 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, which explicitly provides that if a 
magistrate dismisses an information for lack of probable cause, 
"[t]he dismissal and discharge do not preclude the state from 
instituting a subsequent prosecution for the same offense." Utah 
R. Crim. P. 7(h)(3). Refiling, then, is not forbidden by double 
jeopardy and is thus generally permissible under rule 7. Brickev 
does not undermine this rule, but rather focuses on refiling 
limits necessitated by fundamental fairness, the essence of due 
process. See Brickev, 714 P.2d at 646-47. 
If the Brickey Court had intended to create a rebuttable 
presumption of harassment by holding that refiling criminal 
charges always constitutes harassment unless the State proves 
otherwise, it would have found that the plain language of rule 7 
-- then embodied in Utah Code Ann. §77-35-7(d)(1) -- violated due 
1
 Morgan suffers from a similar flaw. There, the majority 
also incorrectly assumed that, absent any indication of 
prosecutorial abuse, Brickev would necessarily bar refiling 
unless a narrow exception justified the refiling. See State v. 
Morgan, 2000 UT App. 48, 997 P.2d 910, cert, granted, 4 P.3d 1289 
(Utah 2000). 
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process and was, therefore, unconstitutional. Instead, the 
Brickey Court reaffirmed a prosecutor's general right to refile 
while, at the same time, establishing safeguards to ensure that a 
defendant's due process rights would not be infringed upon by an 
overzealous prosecutor. Brickev. 714 P.2d at 647-48. By putting 
the burden on the State to prove that new or previously 
unavailable evidence or other good cause justified refiling, the 
Court sought to ensure that specific forms of harassment --
forum-shopping or the repeated filing of groundless claims or 
other "abusive practices" -- would not be used by an overeager 
prosecutor to take unfair advantage of a defendant. Absent these 
improper tactics, however, the prosecutor has every right to 
refile charges.2 
The procedural safeguards enacted in Brickey do not, as 
defendants argue, create a presumption that precludes all but a 
narrow category of refilings. Rather, Brickev's intent is to 
2
 In Brickev, the prosecutor candidly admitted to the trial 
court that he was forum-shopping to find a judge who would bind 
the case over. Brickev, 714 P.2d at 646. On appeal, this Court 
rejected the prosecutor's assertion that he had presented "new 
evidence" at the second preliminary hearing and, in light of the 
admitted abusive practice of forum-shopping, reversed the 
district court's bindover. Id. at 648. In contrast, in this 
case there is no suggestion that the prosecutor acted in bad 
faith in refiling the charges. Indeed, the refiling grew 
directly and obviously out of the court of appeals' opinion sua 
sponte articulating, for the first time, three distinct elements 
of the crime charged. See State v. Redd, 954 P.2d 23 0 (Utah App. 
1998). In Brickev, then, the admitted forum-shopping 
demonstrated bad faith, violative of defendant's right to due 
process. No such abusive practice is implicated here. 
3 
impose a "relatively small burden" on the prosecutor that, at the 
same time, "adequately protect [s]" a defendant from "abusive 
practices" violative of due process. Id. at 647-48. Accord 
State v. Fisk, 966 P.2d 860, 864 (Utah App. 1998)(recognizing in 
dicta that Brickey rule was created to protect defendants from 
forum-shopping and repeated prosecution on "tenuous" charges 
while "ensuring the State may pursue meritorious charges"). In 
essence, the Court in Brickey sought to balance the prosecutor's 
need for freedom to pursue meritorious charges with the 
defendant's need to be protected from overzealous prosecution.3 
The balance struck in Brickey, mandating that only forum-
shopping and other abusive practices implicating a defendant's 
right to due process will preclude refiling, is shared by other 
courts. See, e.g., State v. Ellinq, 506 P.2d 1102, 1103 (Ariz. 
App. 1973)(no forum-shopping involved; reprosecution 
permissible); People v. Sabell, 708 P.2d 463, 466 (Colo. 1985)(no 
3
 This limit on refiling is more restrictive than most. 
See 2 Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure 
§14.3(c) at 158 (1984)("The vast majority [of state courts] 
permit refiling at will, including refiling on the same evidence 
before a different magistrate, absent proof that the prosecutor's 
purpose is to harass the defendant"). See, e.g., People v. 
Galleaos, 54 Cal. App.4th 252, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 666, 667 (Cal. App. 
1997)(finding statutory scheme that freely permitted refilings 
did not violate due process); State v. Eaton, 462 A.2d 502, 503-
04 (Me 1983) (finding no reason in "logic or precedent" to 
prevent refiling); State v. Rubek, 371 N.W.2d 115, 118 (Neb. 
1985)(recognizing that "majority rule" permits refiling of 
previously dismissed information). 
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oppressive tactics; refiling permissible); State v. Bacon, 791 
P.2d 429, 433-34 (Idaho 1990) (no evidence of bad faith or 
purposeful harassment; reprosecution permissible); State v. 
Stockwell, 573 P.2d 116, 124-25 (Idaho 1977)(good faith of 
prosecutor permitted refiling); State v. Pail, 424 N.W.2d 99, 101 
(Neb. 1988) (no forum shopping involved; reprosecution 
permissible). 
Even in jurisdictions where the State's ability to refile is 
limited, the prosecutor is not burdened with a presumption of 
harassment. Rather, the analysis begins with the presumption 
that refiling is permissible but then also provides that due 
process may preclude refiling, depending on the particular 
circumstances of the case. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 481 P.2d 
169, 171 (Okla. App. 1971) ("Not only is refiling without cause 
necessarily burdensome to our overcrowded courts, but it may 
constitute harassment of the accused")(emphasis added); 
Stockwell, 573 P.2d at 124-25 (rejecting refiling as per se due 
process violation in absence of bad faith). This is the approach 
adopted by Brickev, an approach whose continued validity this 
Court should affirm. 
Pefendants' argument fails also because it rests on a 
factually incorrect assumption. Pefendants seek endorsement of a 
rule of law whose starting point is the presumption that officers 
of the court are acting unconstitutionally. Such an approach is 
5 
plainly novel; and nowhere do defendants cite any persuasive 
legal authority for adopting such a fundamentally peculiar rule. 
Indeed, the law is to the contrary. "Official actions by public 
officers, including judicial proceedings, are presumed to have 
been regularly and legally performed." 2 McCormick on Evidence § 
343, at 807 (5th ed.)(footnote omitted). Accord Tooele Bldg. 
Ass'n v. Tooele High School, 134 P.894, 897 (Utah 1913) 
(presumption favors the legality and regularity of the acts of 
public officers); Lustig v. Intermountain Building & Loan Ass'n, 
123 P.2d 707, 709 (Utah 1942)(public officer liquidating savings 
and loan association presumed to be doing so lawfully); Utah 
Liquor Control Commn v. Seventh District Court, 111 P.2d 144, 146 
(officer of Liquor Control Commission presumed to have seized 
only that which was permitted by stcitute) ; Gray v. State, 72 8 So. 
2d 36, 52 (Miss. 1998) (prosecutors are presumed to be acting in 
accord with state and federal constitutions as well as binding 
case law, rules of court, and rules of professional conduct). 
Defendants' argument that Brickey establishes a presumption 
of harassment every time the State refiles charges is thus doubly 
flawed. It ignores the due process balance struck in Brickev 
between minimally burdening prosecutors in their pursuit of 
meritorious charges and adequately protecting defendants from 
overzealous prosecution. Additionally, it misinterprets the 
doctrine of rebuttable presumptions. The due process core of 
6 
Brickey requires reasonable limits on refiling to curb abusive 
prosecutorial practices; it does not, however, mandate the 
draconian presumption that officers of the court, unless proven 
otherwise, are acting unconstitutionally whenever they refile 
charges. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated in the State's opening brief and in 
this reply brief, this Court should reverse the district court 
order dismissing all charges against defendants and remand the 
case for trial. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /& day of December, 2000. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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